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Abstract—In this article we consider the inversion problem for polynomially computable discrete functions.
These functions describe behavior of many discrete systems and are used in model checking, hardware
verification, cryptanalysis, computer biology and other domains. Quite often it is necessary to invert these
functions, i.e. to find an unknown preimage if an image and algorithm of function computation are given.
In general case this problem is computationally intractable. However, many of it’s special cases are very
important in practical applications. Thus development of algorithms that are applicable to these special cases
is of importance. The practical applicability of such algorithms can be validated by their ability to solve the
problems that are considered to be computationally hard (for example cryptanalysis problems). In this article
we propose the technology of solving the inversion problem for polynomially computable discrete functions.
This technology was implemented in distributed computing environments (parallel clusters and Grid-systems).
It is based on reducing the inversion problem for the considered function to some SAT problem. We describe a
general approach to coarse-grained parallelization for obtained SAT problems. Efficiency of each parallelization
scheme is determined by the means of a special predictive function. The proposed technology was validated by
successful solving of cryptanalysis problems for some keystream generators. The main practical result of this
work is a complete cryptanalysis of keystream generator A5/1 which was performed in a Grid system specially
built for this task.
Index Terms—Discrete functions, logical cryptanalysis, SAT, stream ciphers, A5/1, coarse-grained parallelism,
Grid.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Let {0, 1}n , n ∈ N1, be the set of all possible bi-
nary sequences of the length n. We also use the
notation {0, 1}∗ = ⋃n∈N1 {0, 1}n. This workfocuses on the families of discrete functions
of the form
f = {fn}n∈N1 , fn : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}∗ .
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We consider the class formed by the families
of discrete functions for which the following
conditions are satisfied:
1) for every n ∈ N1 the function fn is de-
fined everywhere on {0, 1}n (we denote
this fact as domfn = {0, 1}n);
2) there exists a program Mf for determin-
istic Turing machine which computes an
arbitrary function of the family f ;
3) the time complexity of the program Mf
increases with the increase of n as a
polynomial in n.
Hereafter we write fn ∈ f to indicate the
fact that the discrete function fn belongs to a
family with the properties 1–3. For a discrete
function fn ∈ f given in the form of a pair
(Mf , n) and a word y ∈ range fn, the problem
we are interested in is to find x ∈ domfn,
such that y = fn (x). We call this problem
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2the inversion problem for the function fn in
the point y. The general inversion problem for
family f with properties 1–3 we denote by
Inv (f).
In the present article we describe an ap-
proach that is based on the possibility to re-
duce effectively the problem Inv (f) to SAT.
In the process of reduction of the problem
Inv (f) to a SAT problem there is a possibil-
ity to single out from the set of variables of
the obtained CNF the subset corresponding
to the “input variables” of the considered
function. This is fundamental for construct-
ing of decompositions of SAT problems into
SAT problems of lower dimension with their
subsequent solving in distributed computing
environments. We show that the use of this
simple principle gives good results for the
inversion problems of some discrete functions
used in cryptography.
Let us give a brief outline of the article.
In the second section we give basic notions
of the theory of discrete functions and briefly
describe a technology for reducing inversion
problems of the functions computable in poly-
nomial time to SAT problems, focusing on the
functions used in cryptography.
In the third section, technology of coarse-
grained parallelism that we use for solving
SAT problems, is described. Using this tech-
nology we decompose given SAT problem into
a family of SAT problems of lower dimension.
Such decompositions can be performed in dif-
ferent ways. We are interested in selecting a
decomposition that is good in terms of overall
computing time. This is performed by solving
optimization problem for a special predictive
function.
In the fourth section, we describe some
modifications intended to improve efficiency
of a basic SAT solver for the problem Inv (f).
Here we also give the results of a successful
cryptanalysis of some keystream generators
performed on a low-performance computing
cluster.
The fifth section is entirely devoted to the
use of the technology presented in this paper
for solving the problem of cryptanalysis of
the keystream generator A5/1 using a Grid
system specially constructed for this purpose.
2 REDUCING THE DISCRETE FUNC-
TIONS INVERSION PROBLEMS TO SAT
PROBLEMS
2.1 Basic notions
Hereafter X = {x1, . . . , xn} denotes the set
of Boolean variables. Let L (x1, . . . , xn) be an
arbitrary propositional formula. We denote by
L (α1, . . . , αn) = β the fact that the result of
substitution
x1 = α1, . . . , xn = αn,
αi ∈ {0, 1} , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , into the formula
L (x1, . . . , xn) is β ∈ {0, 1}.
The expressions of the form L(x1, . . . , xn) =
0, L(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 are called Boolean equa-
tions (see [1]). For a fixed β ∈ {0, 1} a
solution of the equation L(x1, . . . , xn) = β
is a vector (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ {0, 1}n, such that
L (α1, . . . , αn) = β. If such a vector does not
exist we say that the Boolean equation does
not have a solutions.
The terms xi, xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are called
literals over X . The literals x and x are called
complementary literals. A clause over X is an
arbitrary disjunction of literals over X , which
does not have repetitive and complementary
literals. Conjunctive normal form (CNF) over
X is an arbitrary conjunction of different
clauses over X .
Let C (x1, . . . , xn) (shortly C) be an arbi-
trary CNF over the set of Boolean variables
X = {x1, ..., xn}. The vector (α1, ..., αn) ∈
{0, 1}
n is called a satisfying assignment of C,
if C (α1, ..., αn) = 1. A CNF for which there
exists a satisfying assignment is called a satis-
fiable CNF, otherwise it is called unsatisfiable.
The problem of deciding satisfiability of an
arbitrary CNF as well as the problem of search
of a satisfying assignment for an arbitrary
satisfiable CNF are the problems we consider
below.
S.A. Cook showed in [2], that the process
of executing a program M , which stops on an
arbitrary input, on a Turing machine with the
input alphabet Σ = {0, 1} can be represented
by a system of Boolean equations.
Let f be a family of discrete functions from
the class defined above. An arbitrary function
fn ∈ f given by a pair (Mf , n) will be consid-
ered as a function of Boolean variables from
the set X = {x1, . . . , xn}. The set X we call
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3the set of input variables of the function fn.
According to [2] there exists an algorithm with
a time complexity bounded by polynomial in
n which given a pair (Mf , n), transforms the
problem of inversion of fn in an arbitrary
point y ∈ range fn into the problem of finding
solutions of the equation of the type
C(x1, . . . , xq(n)) = 1. (1)
Here q (·) is some polynomial, and
C(x1, . . . , xq(n)) is a satisfiable CNF over
the set of Boolean variables {x1, . . . , xq(n)}.
Further we will write “CNF encoding discrete
function inversion problem” meaning CNF
C(x1, . . . , xq(n)) and “equation encoding
discrete function inversion problem” meaning
equation C(x1, . . . , xq(n)) = 1.It should be particularly noted that the pro-
cedure for reducing the inversion problem to
the search for solutions of Boolean equations
must be parsimonious (see [3], [4]). That is,
the number of solutions of (1) must coincide
with the number of preimages of y ∈ range fn,
and a procedure of an effective transition from
an arbitrary solution of (1) to the correspond-
ing preimage must exist. This is essential for
an effective inversion of discrete functions in
practice.
Not all procedures of propositional encod-
ing are parsimonious. However, it is not diffi-
cult to show that well-known Tseitin transfor-
mations have this property. These transforma-
tions were proposed by G.S. Tseitin in 1968 in
[5] (reprinted in [6]). Next, we describe the use
of Tseitin transformations for the problem of
parsimonious reducing of Boolean equations
to normal forms.
These transformations were described (ex-
plicitly or implicitly) in a number of sources
(e.g., [7], [8]) where an original function is
usually represented by a Boolean circuit S (fn)
over an arbitrary complete basis, for exam-
ple {&,¬}. Each variable from X corresponds
to one of n inputs of S (fn). For each logic
gate G some new auxiliary variable v (G) is
introduced. We denote the set of all auxiliary
variables as V . Every AND-gate G is encoded
by CNF-representation of Boolean function
v (G)↔ u& w. Every NOT-gate G is encoded
by CNF-representation of Boolean function
v (G) ↔ ¬u. Here u and w are variables
corresponding to inputs of G. CNF encoding
S (fn) is(
&
G∈S(fn)
C (G)
)
· y1 · . . . · ym,
where C (G) is CNF encoding gate G and
y1, . . . , ym are variables corresponding to out-
puts of S (fn).
In our opinion for the problems considered
in this paper it is more convenient to construct
Boolean equations that encode considered al-
gorithms directly and not to use Boolean cir-
cuits for intermediate representation of these
algorithms (see Section 2.2).
We consider the problem of finding solu-
tions of Boolean equations in the following
general formulation.
F
(
h1
(
x
1
1, . . . , x
1
r1
)
, . . . , hs (x
s
1, . . . , x
s
rs)
)
= 1. (2)
The propositional formulae hi (xi1, . . . , xiri), i ∈
{1, . . . , s}, define some (composite in general
case) Boolean functions. Let
X = {x1, . . . , xn} =
s⋃
i=1
{
xi1, . . . , x
i
ri
}
.
Consider the Boolean equation
C (u1 ↔ h1) · Fh1→u1 (x1, . . . , xn, u1) = 1. (3)
Here by C (u1 ↔ h1) we denote a CNF-
representation of the Boolean function
u1 ↔ h1
(
x11, . . . , x
1
r1
)
over {x11, . . . , x1r1 , u1} , and by
Fh1→u1 (x1, . . . , xn, u1)
we denote the propositional formula obtained
by replacing one or several (perhaps all) for-
mulae h1 (x11, . . . , x1i1) in (2) by the literal u1.The transition from the equation (2) to the
equation (3) is one iteration of the Tseitin
transformations in application to the Boolean
equations.
Let Φ1 and Φ2 are the sets of solutions of the
equations of (2) and (3) respectively. It is not
difficult to show that the reduction from (2) to
(3) described above is parsimonious because
Φ1 and Φ2 are either simultaneously empty
or there exists one-to-one correspondence be-
tween them. Implicitly this fact is mentioned
in [8].
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42.2 Logical cryptanalysis. Propositional
encoding of the keystream generator A5/1
The concept of reducing the problems of crypt-
analysis to the problems of finding solutions
of Boolean equations (in the form of SAT
problems) was first formulated in [9]. One of
the first practical implementations of this idea
was given in [10]. In that paper the problem
of cryptanalysis of the DES cipher was formu-
lated as a SAT problem.
Next, we consider the keystream generator
A5/1 used to encrypt traffic in GSM networks.
A lot of attacks on the cipher A5/1 are de-
scribed, however it is still actively used. A pos-
sible reason of using A5/1 is the lack of con-
vincing experimental results of its cryptanaly-
sis. We consider the problem of cryptanalysis
of the generator A5/1 on the basis of a known
keystream. The problem is to find the secret
key using some fragment of the keystream
and a known algorithm of its generation (see
[11]). The description of the generator A5/1
(see Fig. 1) was taken from the paper [12].
According to [12] generator A5/1 contains
three linear feedback shift register (LFSR, see,
e.g., [11]), given by the following connection
polynomials: LFSR 1:X19+X18+X17+X14+1;
LFSR 2: X22 +X21 + 1; LFSR 3: X23 +X22 +
X21 +X8 + 1.
The secret key of A5/1 generator is the ini-
tial contents of LFSRs 1–3 (64 bits). In each unit
of time τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . } (τ = 0 is reserved for the
initial state) two or three registers are shifted.
The register with number r, r ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is
shifted if χτr (bτ1 , bτ2 , bτ3) = 1, and is not shiftedif χτr (bτ1 , bτ2 , bτ3) = 0. By bτ1 , bτ2 , bτ3 we denotehere the values of the clocking bits at the
current unit of time. The clocking bits are 9-th,
30-th and 52-nd. Corresponding cells in Fig.
1 are black. The function χτr (·) is defined asfollows
χτr (b
τ
1 , b
τ
2 , b
τ
3) =
{
1, bτr = majority (b
τ
1 , b
τ
2 , b
τ
3)
0, bτr 6= majority (b
τ
1 , b
τ
2 , b
τ
3)
where majority (A,B,C) = A ·B∨A ·C ∨B ·C.
In each unit of time the values in the left-
most cells of the registers are added mod 2,
the resulting bit is the bit of the keystream.
Thus, we can see that the generator A5/1
updates the content of each of the registers’
cells as a result of conditional shifts: if the
789 1
4039
2345610111213141516171819
2030313233343536373841
6261 53545556575859606364 52
212223242526272829
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Fig. 1. Scheme of the generator A5/1.
shift does not occur, then a new configuration
of a register does not differ from the old one,
otherwise values of all cells of the register are
updated. Hence with each cell at each unit of
time we can associate a Boolean equation link-
ing a new state of the cell with the previous
one. Let variables x1, . . . , x64 encode the secret
key of generator A5/1 (xi corresponds to cell
with number i ∈ {1, . . . , 64}). By x11, . . . , x164we denote variables encoding cells’ state in the
moment of time τ = 1. System of equations
which links these two sets of variables is:

(
x11 ↔ x1 · χ
1
1 ∨ (⊕i∈Ixi) · χ
1
1
)
= 1(
x12 ↔ x2 · χ
1
1 ∨ x1 · χ
1
1
)
= 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(
x120 ↔ x20 · χ
1
2 ∨ (⊕j∈Jxj) · χ
1
2
)
= 1(
x121 ↔ x21 · χ
1
2 ∨ x20 · χ
1
2
)
= 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(
x142 ↔ x42 · χ
1
3 ∨ (⊕k∈Kxk) · χ
1
3
)
= 1(
x143 ↔ x43 · χ
1
3 ∨ x42 · χ
1
3
)
= 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(
x164 ↔ x64 · χ
1
3 ∨ x63 · χ
1
3
)
= 1(
g1 ↔ x119 ⊕ x
1
41 ⊕ x
1
64
)
= 1
(4)
where I = {14, 17, 18, 19}, J = {40, 41},
K = {49, 62, 63, 64} and g1 is the first bit of
keystream.
Let g1, . . . , gL be the first L bits of the
keystream of A5/1. To the each bit gi, i ∈
{1, . . . , L} we associate a system of the form
(4). To find the secret key it is sufficient to find
a common solution of these systems. The prob-
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5lem of finding of this common solution can
be reduced by the means of Tseitin transfor-
mations to the problem of finding a satisfying
assignment of a satisfiable CNF.
3 COARSE-GRAINED PARALLELIZA-
TION OF SAT PROBLEMS ENCOD-
ING DISCRETE FUNCTIONS INVERSION
PROBLEMS
In this section we describe a technology for
solving SAT problems in distributed comput-
ing systems (hereinafter DCS). Such systems
consist of sets of computing nodes connected
by a communication network. Each node of a
DCS has one or several processors. Typical ex-
amples of DCS are computing clusters which
have become widespread in recent years. The
elementary computational units of modern
DCS are cores of processors.
One of the first works on parallel algorithms
for solving SAT problems is the article [13].
This work describes a technique of paralleliza-
tion of the Davis-Putnam procedure (see [14]
with interprocessor data exchange aimed to
achieve uniform loading of the processors.
Similar ideas are basic for those modern SAT
solvers which use interprocessor exchange of
conflict clauses (see, e.g., [15]).
In the present work a different approach to
parallelization of algorithms for solving SAT
problems is proposed. This approach is pri-
marily oriented to solving the problems from
Inv (f). We show the principal possibility of
using preliminary calculations to determine
good parameters of a decomposition of the
search domain into disjoint subdomains. After
decomposition the obtained subdomains are
processed by isolated processors. In this sense
the main results of this article belong entirely
to the field of the coarse-grained parallelism
(see, e.g., [16]).
We consider an arbitrary CNF C over the
set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} and
select in the set X some subset
X ′ = {xi1 , . . . , xid} , {i1, . . . , id} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} ,
where d ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We call X ′ =
{xi1 , . . . , xid} a decomposition set and d is thepower of the decomposition set. To the decom-
position set X ′, |X ′| = d, we associate the set
Y (X ′) = {Y1, . . . , YK} consisting from K = 2d
different binary vectors of the length d, each
of which is a vector of values of the variables
xi1 , . . . , xid . By Cj = C|Yj , j = 1, . . . ,K , wedenote the CNF obtained after substitutions
of the values from the vectors Yj to C. A
decomposition family generated from the CNF
C by the set X ′, is the set ∆C (X ′), formed by
the following CNFs:
∆C (X
′) = {C1 = C|Y1 , . . . , CK = C|YK} .
It is not difficult to see that any truth as-
signment α ∈ {0, 1}n satisfying C (C|α = 1)
coincides with some vector Y α ∈ Y (X ′) in
the components from X′ and coincides with
some satisfying assignment of the CNF C|Y α ∈
∆C (X
′) in the remaining components. In this
case the CNF C is unsatisfiable if and only
if all the CNF in ∆C (X ′) are unsatisfiable.
Therefore, the SAT problem for the original
CNF C is reduced to K SAT problems for
CNFs from the set ∆C (X ′). For processing the
set ∆C (X ′) as a parallel task list a DCS can
be used.
Note that the idea of such parallelization
itself is not new. A similar in spirit approach
to SAT problems is presented in [17]. The
main novelty of our approach consists in the
described further technique of search of de-
composition sets with “good” properties. This
technique is based on a simple procedure of
statistical prediction.
In the case of arbitrary SAT problems it
is not clear how to form decomposition sets.
However, below we will show that for the SAT
problem encoding the problem of inversion of
a discrete function fn good candidates for the
role of decomposition sets are subsets of the
set of input variables of fn.
If we take as a decomposition set the whole
set of input variables of fn, then every SAT
problem in the obtained family is simple, but
the number of these problems is usually very
big. Thus there arises the following problem
of improvement of a decomposition set. Let
X ′ be some decomposition set (e.g., the set of
input variables of fn). We need to construct a
set X˜ ⊂ X ′, for which there exist some con-
clusions about smaller total processing time of
the list ∆C
(
X˜
)
.
If the power of the set ∆C
(
X˜
)
is too high,
then the prediction of the time of parallel
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6processing of ∆C
(
X˜
)
can be computed based
on the average solving time of SAT prob-
lems for some CNFs that are randomly chosen
(with uniform distribution) from ∆C
(
X˜
)
. By
Q
(
X˜
)
we denote the size of this sample.
Introduce a parameter R to distinguish two
situations: whether it is necessary to form a
random sample or not.
To each set X˜, X˜ ⊆ X ′, such that
2|X˜| > R, we associate the set of vectors{
Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
Q(X˜)
}
, selected from Y
(
X˜
)
with
uniform distribution and the set of CNFs
θC
(
X˜
)
=
{
C′1 = C|Y ′1 , . . . , C
′
Q(X˜) = C|YQ(X˜)
}
.
To each X˜, X˜ ⊆ X ′, such that 2|X˜| ≤ R, we
associate the set Y
(
X˜
)
and the set of CNFs
θC
(
X˜
)
= ∆C
(
X˜
)
.
Thus, to an arbitrary set Ω, Ω ⊆ 2X′ , of the
choice alternatives of X˜ from X ′, the set
ΘC (Ω) =
{
θC
(
X˜
)}
X˜∈Ω
is put in correspondence.
Hereinafter we consider SAT solvers based
on DPLL (see [18]). Using properties of this
algorithm we construct the procedure for pre-
dicting time of parallel solving of SAT prob-
lems which encode discrete functions inver-
sion problems.
Let S be some SAT solver. Denote by t (C ′)
the time of work of the SAT solver S on an
arbitrary CNF C ′. Consider the function τS :
ΘC (Ω)→ N1,
τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
=
∑
C′∈θC(X˜)
t (C′) .
However, for some X˜ (e.g., if X˜ consists of
one variable) CNF from θC
(
X˜
)
can be very
difficult for the SAT solver. In this case the
time required for computing the correspond-
ing value of the predictive function may ex-
ceed reasonable limits. To take this fact into
account we introduce a special function g (C).
Suppose that in accordance with the rules
above the set ΘC (Ω) is constructed. We define
the predictive function as follows.
T
(
θC
(
X˜
))
=


2
|X˜|
Q(X˜)
· τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
,
if 2|X˜| > R, τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
< g(C)
τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
,
if 2|X˜| ≤ R, τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
< g(C)
∞, if τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
≥ g(C)
Notation T
(
θC
(
X˜
))
= ∞ means that the
function is not defined in θC
(
X˜
)
. The value
T
(
θC
(
X˜
))
is the prediction of the time re-
quired for a sequential processing of the list
∆C
(
X˜
)
. Thus the problem of constructing a
“good” decomposition set is reduced to the
problem of minimizing the function T (·) on
the set ΘC (Ω). Knowing the global minimum
of T (·) on ΘC (Ω) we can make a conclusion
about the possibility of parallel solving of a
SAT problem for the CNF C in “a reasonable
time”.
Theorem 1 Consider the problem Inv (f). Let
C be a CNF encoding the problem of inversion
of function fn, fn ∈ f in an arbitrary point
y ∈ rangefn. Then there exist sets Ω, ΘC (Ω) :
|ΘC (Ω) | ≤ 2
n and function T (·) such that the
domain of T (·) is nonempty and global minimum
of T (·) on ΘC (Ω) can be found in time
O (|C| · |ΘC (Ω) |) .
Proof: Suppose that Ω contains the set X
of input variables of function fn. Here we
assume that the CNF C encoding a corre-
sponding inversion problem is constructed in
accordance with the principles described in
Section 2.1. It is known (see, e.g., [19]) that
DPLL remains complete for C even if the set
of decision variables (see [20]) is limited to
X . Thus assigning values to all the variables
from X will result in inference of either a
satisfying assignment of C or a contradiction
(conflict) through the unit propagation (UP,
see [21]). However generally the complexity
of this process has an upper bound of the
kind O (|C|). Therefore it is always possible to
construct some function g (·), g (C) = O (|C|)
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7such that for an arbitrary sample θC (X) the
value of function T (θC (X)) will be defined.
Next, we describe an algorithm based on the
principle of “dynamic programming” for solv-
ing the problem of minimizing the function
T (·) on the set ΘC (Ω).
Let the initial decomposition set X′ be the
set of the input variables of fn and 2|X′| > R.
We construct the set θC (X ′) and find the value
T (θC (X
′)). As already mentioned, this value
can be found effectively. Consequently, the
function T (·) is a defined at least in θC (X ′).
Next, we will try to sequentially improve the
value of the function T (·) on some fixed set
Ω ⊂ 2X
′ .
By i we denote the iteration number of
the algorithm. The results of the initial (i =
0) iteration step are the values τS (θC (X ′))
and T (θC (X ′)). At each iteration step i ≥
1 we compute the values of the functions
τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
and T
(
θC
(
X˜
))
for the corre-
sponding set X˜ ∈ Ω. We denote them as τ i and
T i respectively. For each i ≥ 1 in the process
of calculations we perform frequent checks to
determine whether the current value of T i has
exceeded the value T i−1 which was found
at previous iteration step. If this takes place
then further calculations are useless since the
calculated value T i won’t be better than T i−1.
Then we interrupt the calculations and go
to the next iteration step. For example we
denote by τ0 the value τS (θC (X ′)) and cal-
culate T
(
θC
(
X˜
))
for some X˜, X˜ ⊂ X ′. If the
inequality
τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
> 2|X
′|−|X˜| · τ0
holds and 2|X˜| > R, Q(X˜) = Q (X ′) then
T
(
θC
(
X˜
))
> T (θC (X
′)). Obviously, in this
case the global minimum of T (·) on ΘC (Ω)
cannot be achieved in θC
(
X˜
)
. If in the process
of calculating τS
(
θC
(
X˜
))
the bound g (C) is
exceeded, then the value of T (·) in θC
(
X˜
)
is
not defined.
The result of the described procedure of iter-
ative improvement of the value of the function
T (·) on ΘC (Ω) is a set X∗ ∈ 2X′ , such that
the value of T (θC (X∗)) is minimal (among all
X˜ ∈ Ω). The number of necessary iterations is
|ΘC (Ω)| and upper bound for the time of each
iteration is O (|C|).
Note that even if X ′ is the set of input
variables of a considered function, processing
whole set 2X′ for practically important prob-
lems is unfeasible. Therefore, the peculiarities
of the original formulation should be taken
into account and various heuristics should be
used to form Ω in each particular case. Of
course, there is no guarantee that a decom-
position set better (in terms of total comput-
ing time) then X∗ doesn’t exist. However the
examples described in Section 4 show prac-
tical effectiveness of the proposed method of
predictive functions even with quite simple
techniques of constructing of sets Ω.
Further, we assume that we have some
decomposition set X∗ with a good value
T (θC (X∗)) for some CNF C. The decompo-
sition family generated by the set X∗ we de-
note by ∆∗ (C) = {C1, . . . , CK}, K = 2|X∗|.
Suppose that the considered DCS has M com-
puting cores. The following two cases are pos-
sible.
1) K ≤ M , i.e. the number of CNF in the
family ∆∗ (C) does not exceed the num-
ber of cores of the DCS. In this case for
any CNF from the family ∆∗ (C) the SAT
problem is solved on a separate core. In
practice this situation is very rare.
2) K > M—the number of CNF in the
family ∆∗ (C) is greater then the number
of cores in the DCS.
The situation described in 2 is the most
typical for inversion problems of the crypto-
graphic functions. In this case the decomposi-
tion family ∆∗ (C) is considered as a task list
that is processed in parallel according to the
following scheme. Let us put the CNFs of the
family ∆∗ (C) in some order. We call an arbi-
trary CNF from ∆∗ (C) locked if at the current
moment of time the SAT problem for it has
either been solved or is being solved on some
core of the DCS. The other CNFs are called
free. We select first M CNFs C1, . . . , CM from
the family ∆∗ (C). For each of the selected
CNFs we solve the SAT problem on a separate
core of the DCS. Once some core is released we
launch the procedure of solving of the SAT
problem for the first free CNF of the family
∆∗ (C) on this core. This process continues un-
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∆∗ (C) is found, or until the unsatisfiability of
all CNFs from ∆∗ (C) is proven.
In the next section we describe a somewhat
different strategy of processing the list ∆∗ (C),
which significantly reduces the cost of the
transfer of tasks over a network.
4 CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME KEY-
STREAM GENERATORS ON A COMPUT-
ING CLUSTER
4.1 Adjustments of a SAT solver to solving
the problems of cryptanalysis in distributed
computing environments
In all experiments described further we use
a modified SAT solver Minisat-C v1.14.1 (see
[22]). The first stage of modification consists
in changing the decision variable selection
procedure (see [20]) implemented in Minisat.
Namely, a procedure of assignment of initial
activity (different from zero) for those vari-
ables in the CNF which correspond to the
input variables of the function considered was
added. For the problems of cryptanalysis of
generators this method allows to select, on the
initial stage of the solving process, the vari-
ables corresponding to the secret key as pri-
ority variables for decision variable selection
procedure. Also some basic constants of the
solver were changed. Like most of its analogs
Minisat periodically changes the activity of all
the variables and clauses in order to increase
the priority of selection for variables from the
clauses derived in the later steps of the search.
Moreover, in 2% of cases the Minisat assigns a
value to the variable selected randomly, rather
than to the variable with the maximum activ-
ity. These heuristics show, on average, good
results on a broad set of test examples used in
the competitions of SAT solvers. However, for
the CNFs encoding problem of cryptanalysis
they are, in general, not efficient. In all the
experiments described below we use the SAT
solver in which periodical lowering of the
activity and random selection of variables are
prohibited. In total, this simple change led to
a substantial increase in efficiency of the SAT
solver on cryptographic tests. For example,
on the CNFs from the decomposition family
constructed in the process of cryptanalysis of
the generator A5/1 (see Section 5), the SAT
solvers Minisat 1.14.1 and Minisat 2.0 did not
cope with the tasks in 10 minutes of work (the
computations were interrupted). A modified
Minisat-C v1.14.1 solved these problems in
less than 0.2 seconds on average (see Table 3).
In the preceding section a general procedure
for parallel processing of a list of tasks was
described. During this procedure the control
process monitors the loading of computing
cores and send new tasks to the released
cores. In practice, a direct implementation of
this scheme leads to an excessive growth of
transfer costs, but provides uniform loading
of the cores.
The efficiency of a SAT solver in a DCS can
be improved by using job batches. Each job
batch is a subset of the decomposition family
∆∗ (C). Sending of batches instead of single
CNFs allows to reduce the cost of the transfer.
We decompose ∆∗ (C) into disjoint sets of job
batches. The obtained set of the job batches is
considered as a task list where each job batch
is a list item. For processing this task list we
use the technique described in the previous
section.
The fact that a decomposition set is a set
of Boolean variables makes the problem of
transferring the batches to the cores very sim-
ple. Indeed, let X∗ = {xi1 , . . . , xid} be somedecomposition set. And let M be the number
of computing cores in the DCS. The core with
the number p ∈ {1, . . . ,M} we denote by ep.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that M =
2k, k ∈ N1, and k < d. If we suppose that all
the tasks in the decomposition family ∆∗ (C),
generated by X∗, have approximately equal
complexity, then when solving the problem in
the DCS each core is going to process approx-
imately the same number of tasks. This means
that the decomposition family ∆∗ (C) can be
partitioned into 2k subfamilies of equal power
and each subfamily can be further processed
entirely on the corresponding core. For this
purpose select in X∗ some subset Xk∗ of power
k (Xk∗ can be formed, for example, by the first
k variables from X∗). The description of the
job batch for a particular ep, p ∈ { 1, . . . , 2k},
is a binary vector αp of the length k, formed
by the values of variables from Xk∗ . Next, foreach ep, p = 1, . . . , 2k, we consider the set Λp,
consisting from 2d−k different vectors of the
length d of the form (αp|β), where β takes all
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Each core ep, p ∈ { 1, . . . , 2k}, receives its job
batch from the control process as a vector αp
which is used for constructing the set Λp. A
subfamily of the family ∆∗ (C) processed on
ep is obtained as a result of substitutions of
the vectors from Λp to C.
4.2 Cryptanalysis of some keystream ge-
nerators on a low-performance computing
cluster
It is possible to successfully solve problems of
cryptanalysis of some cryptographically weak
generators (such as the Geffe generator and
the Wolfram generator) on an ordinary per-
sonal computer with the use of SAT approach
(see [23]).
The use of the results described above en-
abled to perform a successful parallel logical
cryptanalysis of the following generators: the
threshold generator (with the key length 80
bits), the summation generator (with the key
length 63 bits) and the Gifford generator (with
the key length 64 bits). These generators are
not considered to be cryptographically strong
since there are several known attacks for them.
However these attacks are sufficiently differ-
ent from each other. By contrast, main stages
of parallel logical cryptanalysis are the same
for all mentioned generators.
For our experiments we used a low-
performance computing cluster Blackford (see
[24]). The computing node of the Blackford
cluster has two processors Intel Xeon Quad-
Core E5345 2.33 GHz and 8 GB of RAM.
This cluster has 20 nodes of the described
configuration.
During the process of cryptanalysis of the
threshold and the summation generators it
was found out that for the successful solving
of these problems it is necessary to include
into a decomposition set the variables encod-
ing full initial contents of several LFSRs. The
CNF obtained after the substitutions of the
values of these variables proved to be very
simple for the SAT solver. This fact allows
us to calculate the value of the predictive
function for the corresponding decomposition
quickly. Then, we remove one variable from
the decomposition set and calculate the value
of the predictive function for the obtained
set again by the algorithm described above
(Section 3). This procedure is repeated until all
variants X˜ from some Ω˜ are tested. Thus for
each generator considered below relationship
among all variants of X˜ is subject to the rule
X˜1 ⊃ X˜2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ X˜r = X∗ ⊃ . . . ⊃ X˜s,
|X˜i+1| = |X˜i| − 1, i = 1, . . . , s− 1 for some s.
The threshold generator was proposed by
J. Bruer in [25] (see also [26]). This generator
contains R,R ≥ 3 LFSRs, that are shifted
simultaneously. On the initial step τ = 0 the
bits of the secret key are placed into LFSRs. At
each moment of time τ, τ ∈ {1, 2, . . .} output
bits of LFSRs are used as arguments of the
majority function. The value of the majority
function is 1 if the majority of its input bits
are 1, and 0 otherwise (see Fig. 2). The output
bits of the majority function (at each moment
of time) form the keystream.
Parallel logical cryptanalysis was applied to
the threshold generator based on five LFSRs
given by the following connection polyno-
mials: LFSR 1: X13 + X10 + X8 + X5 + 1;
LFSR 2: X15+X13+X3+X+1; LFSR 3: X16+
X13 +X8 +X2 + 1; LFSR 4: X17 +X6 +X4+
X2 + 1; LFSR 5: X19 +X18 +X17 +X14 + 1.
Fig. 2. Threshold generator.
Thus, the length of the secret key in the
considered generator was 80 bits. We ana-
lyzed first 150 bits of keystream. The initial
decomposition set X˜1 was formed by the vari-
ables encoding the contents of the first three
LFSRs. The usage of the predictive function
technique resulted in the construction of the
set X∗, which contains the variables encoding
full initial contents of the first two LFSRs, plus
one variable corresponding to the rightmost
bit of the third LFSR. We generated 10 random
tests, where “true random“ sequences (see
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[27]) were used as secret keys. The results of
cryptanalysis are presented in Table 1 (the cor-
rect secret keys were found in all tests). During
the cryptanalysis of the threshold generator on
a cluster the effect of super-linear acceleration
was observed. In our opinion this can be
explained by the practical incompleteness of
the SAT solvers we use (see Section 3).
The summation generator was proposed by
R. Rueppel (see [28], [11]). In this generator,
like in the threshold one, each bit of the key-
stream is an output of a nonlinear function.
The function’s inputs are outputs of several
simultaneously shifted LFSRs (see Fig. 3).
The only difference between this generator
and the threshold one is usage of a special
summation function (see [11]) instead of the
majority function. The summation function
uses Carry-register, that is dynamically up-
dated during the work of the generator. The
secret key consists of the initial contents of the
Carry-register and LFSRs.
Fig. 3. Summation generator.
On the initial step τ = 0 the bits of the
secret key are placed into the Carry-register
and LFSRs. At each moment of time τ =
1, 2, . . . LFSRs simultaneously output the bits
zτj , j = 1, . . . , R, on the basis of which thefollowing values:
Sτ =
R∑
i=1
zτi +Cτ−1, Cτ =
⌊
Sτ
2
⌋
.
are calculated. The bit ϕτ = (Sτ ,mod2) is
outputted to the keystream, and the binary
representation of the number Cτ is placed into
the Carry-register.
Parallel logical cryptanalysis was applied to
the summation generator based on the follow-
ing four LFSRs: LFSR 1: X13+X4+X3+X+1;
LFSR 2: X15+X5+X4+X2+1; LFSR 3: X16+
X6+X4+X+1; LFSR 4:X17+X6+X4+X2+1.
Thus, two unknown bits of the initial con-
tents of the Carry-register and 61 bits of the
initial contents of the LFSRs together form
the secret key of the length of 63 bits. We
analyzed the first 180 bits of the keystream.
Using the technique of predictive functions we
constructed a decomposition set X∗, formed
by the variables encoding the initial contents
of the first two LFSRs (28 variables). The re-
sults of parallel logical cryptanalysis of this
generator are shown in Table 1.
The Gifford generator was developed by a
group led by J. Gifford in 1984 (see [29]) and
for quite a long time it was used in practice
for the transmission of text information. The
first successful attack on the Gifford generator
is described in the article [30], where a very
complicated mathematical apparatus specially
developed for cryptanalysis of this generator
was presented. A distinctive feature of the
Gifford generator is that it does not use LFSRs.The algorithm of the generator processes
the information in groups of 8 bits. On the
initial step τ = 0, in the cells B1, B2, . . . , B8the bytes b01, . . . , b08 of the secret key (the totallength is 64 bits) are written (see Fig. 4). The
keystream is a sequence of bytes T1, T2, . . . ,outputted by the generator at the moments of
time τ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. At each step contents of
the cells B1, B2, . . . , B8 is shifted by one byteto the right. At the same time old content of
the cell B8 is discarded and the new contentof the cell B1 is calculated using the feedbackfunction:
b
τ+1
1 = f(b
τ
1 , b
τ
2 , b
τ
8) = b
τ
1⊕(>>
∗
1 (b
τ
2))⊕(<<1 (b
τ
8)).
Notation >>∗1 means operation of right shiftby one bit with the preservation of the high-
order bit (sticky right-shift). Notation <<1
means the operation of left shift by one bit
with shifting in zero in the low-order bit (zero-
fill left shift). I.e. for B = (x1, x2, . . . , x8) we
have
>>∗1 (B) = (x1, x1, x2, . . . , x7),
<<1 (B) = (x2, x3, . . . , x8, 0).
To calculate a byte of a keystream a nonlinear
output function h : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}8 is used.
This function gets four input bytes (the con-
tents of the cells B1, B3, B5, B8), and outputsa single byte:
h(B1, B3, B5, B8) = ExtractByte3((B1|B3)×(B5|B8)).
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Here | is a concatenation of the contents of
the corresponding cells, and × is an integer
multiplication. Thus, the argument of the func-
tion ExtractByte3 is a natural number. Binary
representation of this number is 32-bit vector.
Output of the function ExtractByte3 (x) is the
third byte from the left of this vector.
Fig. 4. Gifford generator.
The structure of decomposition sets for Gif-
ford generator is completely different from
the structure of these sets for the generators
that use LFSRs. Note that the initial content
of LFSR defines all of its subsequent states.
The structure of decomposition sets in the
problems of cryptanalysis of the threshold
and summation generators is determined by
this very fact. Since the Gifford generator
doesn’t use LFSRs, the following simple strat-
egy for constructing the initial decomposition
set proved to be the most efficient: the set X˜1
consisted of the variables encoding values of
the first 32 bits of the secret key. Then the
value of the predictive function was improved
according to the method similar to that consid-
ered above: each new decomposition set was
obtained from a previous one as a result of the
removal of some variable. We analyzed first
160 bits of the keystream.
In the end, the technique of predicting func-
tions applied to the Gifford generator gave the
following result: if the number of computing
cores of a cluster is 2k, then one needs to
parallelize the SAT problem in k variables
corresponding to the first k bits of the secret
key. Therefore, in the case of the Gifford gen-
erator the power of the decomposition family
TABLE 1
Results of cryptanalysis (10 tests for each
generator)
Generator,
secret key
length /
analyzed
fragment of
the
keystream
Time of parallel
solving on 80 cores of
the Blackford cluster
Time of
solving
on a
single
core
Min Max Aver
Threshold
5 LFSR,
80 bits /
first 150 bits
10
min.
46
min.
27
min.
> 2 days
(inter-
rupted)
Summation
4 LFSR,
63 bits /
first 180 bits
1 h.
14 min.
7 h.
43 min.
3 h.
21 min.
> 2 days
(inter-
rupted)
Gifford,
64 bits /
first 160 bits
7 min. 9 h.
53 min.
4 h.
57 min.
for some
tests less
than 1
day
∆∗(C) coincides with the number of comput-
ing cores. For our experiments we had 80 cores
available on the cluster. Since 80 is not a power
of 2 the original SAT problem was parallelized
in 6 variables which resulted in 64 tasks. To
load the remaining cores we divided 15 of
the initial 64 SAT problems into two subtasks
each, thus obtaining 79 tasks. One remaining
core performed the controlling functions.
Fig. 5. Fragment of the process of optimization
of a predictive function for the threshold gener-
ator.
On the Fig. 5 we give an example of a
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graph displaying process of optimization of a
predictive function for the threshold generator
cryptanalysis. The white columns indicate that
for the corresponding variants of the decom-
position set the calculation of the predictive
function was interrupted because of exceeding
the current threshold value (see Section 3).
5 CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE GENERA-
TOR A5/1 IN A GRID SYSTEM
5.1 Construction of a decomposition set
The problem of constructing a good decompo-
sition set for the parallel cryptanalysis of A5/1
proved to be quite nontrivial. We investigated
different variants of constructing of decom-
position set. First, using some “reasonable“
assumptions, we constructed a basic decom-
position set X ′. Then we tried to reduce it
applying the predictive function technique.
We propose to include into the decomposi-
tion set X ′ the variables encoding the initial
states of the cells of registers, starting with
the first cells until the cells containing clocking
bits inclusive (corresponding cells in the Fig.
6 are dark shaded). Thus, the decomposition
set X ′ consists of 31 variables:
X
′ = {x1, . . . , x9, x20, . . . , x30, x42, . . . , x52} (5)
This choice is motivated by the following
considerations. Assigning values to all vari-
ables from X ′ we determine the exact values
of clocking bits for a large number of subse-
quent states of all three registers. These clock-
ing bits are the most informative because they
determine the value of the majority function.
The fact that we couldn’t further reduce the
set X ′ (5) by applying the predictive function
technique was quite unexpected. In our statis-
tical experiments for each variant of decompo-
sition set and the initial fragment of the key-
stream of some fixed length we constructed
random samples of the volume of 1000 CNF.
For each such sample we calculated the value
of the predictive function (see Section 3). In the
Table 3 we show the values of the predictive
function calculated for different variants of
decomposition sets and keystream lengths. All
of the variants of decomposition sets, nev-
ertheless, are conceptually similar to (5). For
example, a decomposition set consisting of 30
789 1
4039
2345610111213141516171819
20313233343536373841
6261 53545556575859606364
212223242526272829
42434445464748495051
30
52
Fig. 6. Scheme of a decomposition set consist-
ing of 31 variables.
variables was formed according to the scheme
on Fig. 7.
In all computational experiments SAT prob-
lems were solved using a modified variant of
the SAT solver Minisat-C v1.14.1 (the details
of modification are described in Section 4). As
a test platform a single core of the processor
Intel E8400 + 2Gb RAM was used.
789 1
4039
2345610111213141516171819
20313233343536373841
6261 53545556575859606364
212223242526272829
42434445464748495051
30
52
Fig. 7. Scheme of a decomposition set consist-
ing of 30 variables.
Next, we present the prognosis of the time
required for solving the problem of cryptanal-
ysis of the generator A5/1 on the compu-
tational cluster SKIF MSU “Chebyshev” (see
[31]) that consists of 1250 quad-core processors
E5472 (the peak performance of the cluster is
60 Tflop/s). Table 2 shows the comparative
characteristics of the processor Intel E5472 and
the processor Intel E8400.
From this table we can see that the cores
of Intel E8400 and Intel E5472 are comparable
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in power (there is only a slight difference in
the bus frequency). Because of this we think
it is reasonable to use the results of the nu-
merical experiments shown in the Table 3 for
the estimation of the time required for the
solving the problem of logical cryptanalysis
of the generator 5/1 on the cluster SKIF MSU
“Chebyshev”. In addition, note that the use of
the technique of job batches transfer described
in the previous section, makes the impact of
transfer costs on the overall computation time
quite negligible.
TABLE 2
Characteristics of processors
Processor model Intel E8400 Intel E5472
Number of cores 2 4
Core frequency 3.0 GHz 3.0 GHz
Bus frequency 1333 MHz 1600 MHz
Cache L2 6 Mb 12 Mb
TABLE 3
Values of the predictive function for a single
core of the processor Intel E8400 for the
generator A5/1 cryptanalysis (in hundreds
millions of seconds)
Power of the
decomposition set
Length of keystream
128 144 160 176 192
29 3.87 3.80 3.69 3.95 3.76
30 3.65 3.59 3.59 3.71 3.83
31 3.76 3.55 3.71 3.73 3.81
32 4.23 4.15 4.27 4.39 4.32
33 4.70 4.87 4.89 4.95 5.23
From all the above, our estimation of the
computing time of logical cryptanalysis of
A5/1 on the “Chebyshev” cluster is 9–12
hours in average. The corresponding param-
eters of the decomposition are: the power of
decomposition set—31 variables (Fig. 6), the
number of analyzed bits of the keystream—
144 (first bits of the stream).
5.2 The necessity of application of dis-
tributed computing technologies to the
problem of cryptanalysis of the generator
A5/1
The predicted time for solving of this problem
on the supercomputer “Chebyshev” shows
that even if the cluster is fully dedicated to
this task, the process of solving requires con-
siderable time. Exclusive use of public access
multiprocessor computing complexes is usu-
ally not possible. At the same time, the re-
searchers often have resources of various clus-
ters, Grid systems, high-performance servers
at their disposal. The software complex BNB-
Grid [32] makes it possible to use such het-
erogeneous distributed computing resources
(called computing nodes) for solving complex
computational problems. It has already shown
high efficiency in application to several large
scale optimization problems [33].
The structure of the computational algo-
rithm for solving the problem of cryptanalysis
of the generator A5/1 allows an efficient im-
plementation in parallel and distributed sys-
tems. This is possible because subtasks of the
decomposition family can be processed inde-
pendently. Next, we describe the process of
solving the problem of cryptanalysis of A5/1
in the BNB-Grid which uses computational
resources of several multiprocessor systems.
5.3 Computing complex BNB-Grid
Hierarchical structure of BNB-Grid is shown
on the Fig. 8. On the top level the ob-
ject Computing Space Manager (CS-Manager)
is located. It decomposes the original prob-
lem into subproblems and distributes them
among the computing nodes. For each com-
puting node there is a corresponding object
of the type Computing Element Manager (CE-
Manager). CE-Manager provides communica-
tion between CS-Manager and the correspond-
ing computing node and also starts and stops
applications on this node. After receiving a
task from the CS-Manager, CE-Manager trans-
fers it to the corresponding node and starts
MPI application BNB-solver which processes
the received task on all available cores.
The core of the system is implemented in
Java programming language using the mid-
dleware Internet Communication Engine (ICE)
[34]—an analog of CORBA. The graphical user
interface is also implemented as an ICE-object,
indicated on the figure as GUI Manager. ICE-
objects are located either on one or on several
computers within a local network.
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Fig. 8. Organization of computations in BNB-
Grid.
Several copies of the BNB-Solver application
can be started on one computing node. This
approach is often proved to be reasonable for
shared access supercomputers working under
the control of batch processing systems. In
such systems an application requesting a large
number of processors can be queued for a long
time waiting for an appropriate “window”
in the tasks schedule. At the same time, an
application requesting a significantly smaller
number of processors can be launched earlier.
5.4 Parallel solving of SAT problems in
BNB-Grid
A module for processing SAT problems on
a computing cluster was added to the BNB-
Solver. The input data of the control object
CS-Manager is a description of the original
SAT problem in XML format. CS-Manager
decomposes SAT problem for the original CNF
C and obtains decomposition family ∆∗ (C).
CE-Manager transfer job batches, constructed
according to the technique described in the
Section 4, to the computing nodes.
For better efficiency of the solving pro-
cess some reasonable compromise between the
number of job batches and the number of
tasks in a batch should be achieved. A large
number of tasks in a batch allows us to reduce
idle time of the processors. However when
the number of tasks in a batch is too large
its processing time increases greatly. But this
is undesirable because an application which
requests too many resources of a cluster may
be queued for a long time or even will not be
run at all.
For solving of the problem of logical crypt-
analysis of generator A5/1 in the BNB-Grid
a following decomposition was used. The de-
composition family itself consisted of 231 SAT
problems. It was split into 218 disjoint subsets
(job batches) with 213 SAT problems in each
of them. These job batches were processed by
BNB-solvers.
5.5 Computational experiments
In our experiments three test problems of
cryptanalysis of generator A5/1 were solved.
The computations were carried out on four
computing clusters, which characteristics (see
Table 4) are taken from the 11-th edition of
the list of the most powerful supercomputers
in the CIS [35].
The number of simultaneously working
computing cores varied in the process of cal-
culations from 0 to 5568, averaging approxi-
mately 2–3 thousand cores. For each test com-
putations were stopped after finding the first
satisfying assignment. The first test problem
was solved (the secret key of the generator
was found) in 56 hours, the second and the
third—in 25 and 122 hours of Grid system
work.
The problem of cryptanalysis of generator
A5/1 is also interesting because the same key-
stream of arbitrary length can be generated
from different secret keys. This fact was noted
by J. Golic in [36]. We denote these situations
as “collisions” using the evident analogy with
the corresponding notion from the theory of
hash functions. The approach presented in
this article allows us to solve the problem of
finding all the collisions of the generator A5/1
for a given fragment of a keystream. Using
BNB-Grid we found all collisions for one test
problem (we analyzed the first 144 bits of
keystream). It turned out that there are only
three such collisions (see Table 5). Processing
this test problem took 16 days of Grid system
work.
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TABLE 4
Characteristics of computing clusters
Name Institution Processors Number
of cores
MVS-100k Joint Super-
computer
Center of
RAS
Xeon E5450
3 GHz
7920
SKIF-MSU
Chebyshev
Moscow
State
University
Xeon E5472
3 GHz
5000
Cluster of
RRC
RRC
Kurchatov
Institute
Xeon 5345
2.33 GHz
3456
BlueGene P Moscow
State
University
Power PC
850 MHz
8192
TABLE 5
Original key and collisions of generator A5/1
(in hexadecimal format)
LFSR 1 LFSR 2 LFSR 3
x1, . . . , x19 x20, . . . , x41 x42, . . . , x64
orig. key 2C1A7 3D35B9 EEAF2
collision 2C1A7 3E9ADC EEAF2
collision 2C1A7 3D35B9 77579
6 CONCLUSION
In this work a parallel technology for solv-
ing inversion problems for discrete functions
computable in polynomial time is presented.
This technology is based on a reduction of the
considered problems to SAT problems. Using
the information about the input variables of
the considered function we construct a decom-
position of the corresponding SAT problem
into a family of subproblems. Then, this family
is processed as a parallel task list in a dis-
tributed computing environment. To construct
a good decomposition we use technique of
optimization of a special predictive function.
The technology presented in the work
was tested on problems of cryptanalysis of
some keystream generators (threshold, sum-
mation, Gifford generator). These problems
were solved on a low-performance computing
cluster. For solving the problem of cryptanal-
ysis of the keystream generator A5/1 a Grid-
system was specially constructed. Although
this task was quite time-consuming (from
1 to 16 days), all the tests were correctly
solved. Thus, the possibility of cryptanalysis
of A5/1 in public access computing environ-
ments without using of special computing
architectures (like for example in [37]) was
experimentally confirmed.
An implementation of the described tech-
nology in more powerful Grid-systems or on
high performance clusters makes the problem
of cryptanalysis of A5/1 solvable within sev-
eral hours. We particularly emphasize that our
approach makes it possible to find a secret key
using only very small fragment of keystream
(first 144 bits). This result can be considered
as one of many votes against the widespread
use of the cipher A5/1. On the webpage [38]
CNFs encoding the problem of cryptanalysis
of the generator A5/1 are available.
Let us emphasize that the main purpose
of the present work was the development of
a technology for solving inversion problems
for polynomially computable discrete func-
tions in distributed computing environments.
The results of cryptanalysis presented in the
article were not the ultimate goal itself and
should be considered only as arguments for
the efficiency of the proposed technology.
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